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UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
ANNOTATIONS
This section contains a digest of all reported decisions from jurisdictions
interpreting provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code published from
February 22, 1964 through the first week of June, 1964, in the National
Reporter System.
MICHAEL L. ALTMAN
GEORGE M. DOHERTY
CRYSTAL J. LLOYD
BARRY E. ROSENTHAL
JOSEPH F. RYAN
ARTICLE 1: GENERAL PROVISIONS
SECTION 1-201. General Definitions
0. M. SCOTT CREDIT CORP. V. APEX INC.
— R.I. —, 198 A.2d 673 (1964)	 [ Section 1-201 ( 9) ]
Annotated under Section 9-307, infra.
BOEING AIRPLANE CO. V. O'MALLEY
329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964)	 [Section 1-201 (27) ]
Annotated under Section 2-316, infra.
YENTZER V. TAYLOR WINE Co.
409 Pa. 338, 199 A.2d 463 (1964)
	 [ Section 1-201 (32, 33 ) ]
Annotated under Section 2-318, infra.
ARTICLE 2: SALES
SECTION 2-102. Scope; Certain Security and Other Transactions
Excluded From This Article
EPSTEIN V. GIANNATTASIO
25 Conn. Super. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-314, infra.
SECTION 2-103. Definitions and Index of Definitions
YENTZER V. TAYLOR WINE Co.
409 Pa. 338, 199 A.2d 463 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-318, infra.
so
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SECTION 2-105. Definitions: Transferability; "Goods"; "Future"
Goods; "Lot"; "Commercial Unit"
EPSTEIN V. GIANNATTASIO
25 Conn. Super. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-314, infra.
SECTION 2-106. Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement";
"Contract for Sale"; "Sale"; "Present
Sale"; "Conforming" to Contract;
"Termination"; "Cancellation"
EPSTEIN V. GIANNATTASIO
25 Conn. Super. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-314, infra.
SECTION 2-204. Formation in General
WILMINGTON TRUST CO. V. COULTER
— Del. —, 200 A.2d 441 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-205, infra.
SECTION 2-205. Firm Offers
WILMINGTON TRUST CO. V. COULTER
— Del. —, 200 A.2d 441 (1964)
The Wilmington Trust Company held, as co-trustee, 82% of the stock
of the Toledo, Peoria & Western Railroad Company (TP & W) which it was
authorized to sell with the written consent of Gladson, the other co-trustee.
On April 15, 1955, the Trust Co. agreed to sell 52% of the TP & W stock
to the Santa Fe and Pennsylvania Railroads at $100 per share. This sale
was expressly made subject to the approval of the I.C.C., the boards of the
purchasing railroads and Gladson. However, before the Pennsylvania board
had approved, Heineman made an offer on behalf of the Minneapolis and
St. Louis Railroad Company (M& StL) to buy all of the Trust Co.'s TP &
W stock at $133.33 per share. The Trust Co. did not inform co-trustee
Gladson of Heineman's offer and the April 15th agreement was subsequently
confirmed. Later, under pressure from the trust beneficiaries, the Trust
Co. withdrew from the April 15th agreement and ultimately sold all of
its TP & W stock to Santa Fe at $135 per share. Santa Fe then sold to
Pennsylvania half of the stock it had purchased at the price it had paid.
Pennsylvania instituted suit against the trustees to enforce the April 15th
agreement of $100 per share, and the trustees, settled by paying Pennsyl-
vania $500,000. The Trust Co. was then charged with negligence and sur-
charged $500,000 by the lower court for not informing co-trustee Gladson of
Heineman's $133.33 offer at a time when the April 15th agreement bad
not yet been confirmed.
On motion for re-argument after the decree was affirmed, the Trust Co.
argued that under Section 2-205 of the Uniform Commercial Code the
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April 15th transaction was a binding offer which could not be revoked
for a reasonable period of time, and that it could not have been withdrawn
even if co-trustee Gladson had been seasonably notified of Heineman's offer.
The court ruled, however, that Section 2-205 was inapplicable to the April
15th agreement because (1) the section applies only to merchants; (2) the
Trust Co. in the absence of the written consent of Gladson could not
make a firm offer to sell; and (3) the April 15th agreement contained
no assurance that the offer would be held open. The court noted that
the Trust Co. was free to repudiate its agreement of April i5th prior
to approval by the Pennsylvania board, but had this approval been given
and Gladson's consent received, the agreement would have taken on an
entirely different aspect by reason of Section 2-204. This section provides
that a contract will not fail for indefiniteness if there is a reasonably certain
basis for giving an appropriate remedy.
COMMENT
Section 2-205 deals with firm offers and states that a merchant who
assures that his offer will be kept open may not retract it until a reasonable
time has elapsed, even though no consideration supports the promise to keep
the offer open. However, there must be authority to make a firm offer, a clear
statement of assurance, and in no case can the period of irrevocability
exceed three months.
The court might have held Section 2-205 inapplicable on another ground,
namely, that Article 2 deals solely with the sale of goods (Section 2-102) and
that under Section 2-105, shares of stock are not goods. On this point, see
the Official Comment to Section 2-105 and In Re Carter's Claim, 390 Pa.
365, 134 A.2d 908 (1957).
B.E.R.
SECTION 2-305. Open Price Term
AMERICAN SAND & GRAVEL, INC. V. CLARK & FRAY CONSTR. CO .
2 Conn. Cir. 284, 198 A.2d 68 (1964)
In 1961, the defendant-buyer negotiated with the plaintiff-seller for the
possible purchase of 20,000 to 25,000 tons of bankrun sand at 45 cents per
ton. The plaintiff heard nothing further from the defendant until February 3,
1963, when the defendant requested, and in the following weeks received,
1538.30 tons of sand. The plaintiff charged 55 cents, the price charged to
all customers except those with special arrangements.
When the defendant refused to pay, the plaintiff brought the present
action for the price. The defendant argued that a contract existed at a
price of 45 cents per ton. The court ruled that no contract existed at 45
cents because a gap in time of between one and two years was an unreasona-
ble length of time for the plaintiff to be expected to wait in order to learn
whether the defendant accepted at the special price. The court further ruled
that, even if a contract for 45 cents did exist, it was conditional on the
purchase of between 20,000 and 25,000 tons. Since no contract existed at
45 cents and since the parties had not agreed on the price when the sand
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was acquired, the defendant was required under Section 2-305 (1) (a) to pay
a reasonable price, which was 55 cents.
COMMENT
Under Section 2-305 (1) (a), when nothing is said as to price, the
price is a reasonable one. This is the same rule that obtained under Sec-
tion 9(4) of the Uniform Sales Act.
B.E.R.
SECTION 2-313. Express Warranties by Affirmation, Promise,
Description, Sample
HAMILTON V. SCIIWADRON
82 N.J. Super. 493, 198 A.2d 128 (1964)
The plaintiff purchased a diamond ring from the defendant for $6,500.
The defendant, who held himself out as an expert in diamonds, represented
that the retail market value of the ring was $8,000 to $9,000. The ring,
however, was later appraised for only $5,500. The plaintiff then delivered the
ring back to the defendant to receive in return either his $6,500 or a ring of
the value originally represented. The defendant neither returned the $6,500
nor delivered a new ring, and refused to return the $5,500 ring. The plaintiff
brought suit and obtained from the trial court a writ of Capias Ad Respon-
dendum and an order that the defendant be held to bail of $6,500. The
defendant moved to quash the writ and discharge the bail order, which
motion the court granted. The plaintiff appealed, alleging that the trial
court erred in granting the defendant's motion and that the original order
should be reinstated.
The superior court reinstated the writ of Capias and the bail order,
holding that an order to hold to bail for the fraudulent contraction of a
debt did not have to be supported by proof of a fraudulent intent at the time
of the contracting. There was sufficient proof of conversion by the defendant,
a fraudulent act which resulted directly from the bailment contract. This
was sufficient under New Jersey law to justify the issuance of a Capias.
The defendant contended that his representations went only to the value
of the ring and that such misrepresentations under Section 12 of the Uniform
Sales Act (R.S. 46:30-18, N.J.S.A.) could not be construed as a warranty.
But the court summarily dismissed this argument, noting that the action
was not predicated upon breach of warranty but upon whether there was
sufficient evidence of fraud to justify the issuance of a Capias. Section
2-313(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code was cited but did not govern
the case.
COMMENT
Though Section 2-313(2) specifically provides that "an affirmation
merely of the value of the goods ... does not create a warranty," nothing
in the Code precludes a party from bringing an action for fraud when an
intentional misrepresentation of value is made.
M.L.A.
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SECTION 2-314. Implied Warranty: Merchantability;
Usage of Trade
WEBSTER V. BLUE SHIP TEA Room, INC.
— Mass. —, 198 N.E.2d 309 (1964)
The plaintiff, a New Englander, was served fish chowder in the de-
fendant's restaurant. Though she looked at the spoonfuls while eating, she
failed to notice a fishbone which subsequently lodged in her throat. An action
for breach of implied warranty of merchantability was brought under Sec-
tion 2-314, and the plaintiff received a verdict. On appeal, the court reversed,
holding that there is no implied warranty that fish chowder will not contain
fishbones. As a matter of law, fishbones do not constitute a foreign substance
nor do they render the chowder unwholesome; the presence of fishbones
in fish chowder is to be anticipated. In recounting the history of fish chowder,
the court noted the hearty nature of the dish and emphasized that neither
ancient nor modern recipes called for the removal of fishbones.
COMMENT
Compare DeGraff v. Myers Foods, Inc., 19 Pa. D. & C.2d 19 (Bucks
County Ct. 1958), in which it was held to be a question of fact whether the
seller of chicken pie impliedly warrants that the pie will be free from bones.
J.F.R.
EPSTEIN V. GIANNATTASIO
25 Conn. Super. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1964)
The plaintiff went to the defendant Giannattasio's beauty parlor for
a beauty treatment during which products manufactured by the defendants
Sales Affiliates, Inc. and Clairol, Inc. were used. Alleging that such treatment
caused her acute dermatitis and loss of hair, the plaintiff brought suit for
negligence and breach of warranty. All three defendants demurred on the
ground that the transaction did not amount to a sale of goods; in addition,
Clairol, Inc. demurred on the ground that any warranties it might have
given did not extend to the plaintiff. The court first held that on the basis of
Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., 24 Conn. Super. 409, 192 A.2d 555, annot.
5 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 156 (1963), Clairol's second ground for
demurring was unavailing. It then sustained the three demurrers on the
ground that the predominant feature of the beauty treatment was service
and not a sale of goods and that under Sections 2-102, 2-105 and 2-106, a
warranty action could not lie unless there were a sale of goods within the
meaning of the Code.
COMMENT
In the course of its opinion the court cited Albrecht v. Rubinstein,
135 Conn. 243, 63 A.2d 158 (1948), and Lynch v. Hotel Bond Co., 117
Conn. 128, 167 Atl. 99 (1933), for the proposition that the serving of food
in restaurants is fundamentally a service and not a sale of food. It then
analogized these cases to the present one and held that the beauty treat-
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ment was better characterized as a service than a sale of the products applied
to the plaintiff's hair. But it is. difficult to understand why the court cited
Albrecht and Lynch when the proposition for which these cases stand has
been expressly repudiated by Section 2-314 which provides that "the serving
for value of food or drink to be consumed on the premises or elsewhere
is a sale." (Emphasis supplied.). See Webster v. Blue Ship Tea Room, Inc.,
198 N.E.2d 309 (Mass. 1964), annotated in this issue under Section 2-314.
In sustaining the manufacturers' demurrers on the ground that there
was no sale of goods to the plaintiff, the court has come into conflict with
a previously decided Connecticut case which dispensed with the requirement
of a sale: Connolly v. Hagi, 24 Conn. Super. 198, 188 A.2d 884 (1963),
annot. 5 B.C. Ind. & Coin. L. Rev. 303 (1964). In that case the plaintiff
was performing a service, repairing the defendant Hagi's automobile, when
due to a mechanical defect in the car he was injured. He sued Hagi for
negligence and also the manufacturer Chrysler for breach of warranty.
Chrysler demurred, alleging lack of privity, but the court overruled the
demurrer, stating: "It would appear that the warranty should be extended
to all those who could reasonably be anticipated to use, occupy, or service
the operation of the chattel. . [T]he protection of the automobile repair-
man against dangers of a defectively manufactured motor vehicle is a logical
development of the modern trend of employing warranties of merchanta-
bility and use as a matter of public policy. The necessity of a contract of
sale between the parties is disappearing. It is the ultimate consumer who
is to be protected. The plaintiff may be regarded as an ultimate consumer
within this concept." (Emphasis supplied.) In taking this position, the
Connolly court was merely extending the car owner's warranty to the plain-
tiff as Section 2-318 permits. Not incidentally, it was also affirming the
liberal approach earlier taken in Simpson v. Powered Prods., Inc., cited
supra, and Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69
(1960).
M.L.A.
SECTION 2-315. Implied Warranty: Fitness for
Particular Purpose
BOEING AIRPLANE CO. V. O'MALLEY
329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964)
Annotated under Section 2-316, infra.
SECTION 2-316. Exclusion or Modification of Warranties
BOEING AIRPLANE CO, V. O'MALLEY
329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964)
On October 6, 1959, Vertol Aircraft, a division of Boeing, sold Atlas
Corporation a helicopter. Article 6 of the contract of sale, entitled "War-
ranty," stated:
(a) Vertol warrants that it is the full legal and beneficial owner of
the helicopter described in Article 1, and that it is not subject to any
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lien, charge, or encumbrance.
(b) The foregoing warranty is given and accepted in lieu of any and
all other warranties, express or implied, arising out of the sale of
helicopter.
Atlas Corporation had been organized for the purpose of buying the heli-
copter which was to be used in various lifting and transportation work.
The officials of Atlas were inexperienced in the use of helicopters, which
Vertol's agents knew. After purchasing the craft, Atlas found it inadequate
for its purposes and notified Vertol. Eventually, Atlas went into liquidation
and in February, 1961, demanded the return of its purchase price plus
damages. By the terms of the contract, Pennsylvania law was to control.
At the trial, the court found that an implied warranty of fitness for a par-
ticular purpose bad arisen under Section 2-315, that it had not been
effectively disclaimed in the contract of sale, and that it had been breached.
Judgment was accordingly given to the plaintiff.
On appeal, affirmed. Vertol knew the particular purposes for which
the helicopter was to be used and was aware that Atlas was relying on
its (Vertol's) skill and judgment in the selection of the helicopter. Hence
there arose under Section 2-315 an implied warranty of fitness. As to the
disclaimer, Section 2-316 of the controlling 1954 Code provided that ex-
clusions of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a
particular purpose had to be in specific language and that ambiguities
were to be resolved against the seller. Here, the disclaimer was not so "clear,
definite, and specific" as to leave the intent of the parties free from doubt.
The court noted parenthetically that even if the 1958 version of Section
2-316 were applicable, the disclaimer would not have been effective since
it was not conspicuous, being in the same color and size of print as the
rest of the contract.
The court also noted that Atlas' notification of breach was not given
so long after the sale as to be unreasonable as a matter of law. Although
some fourteen months had passed between sale and notification, Vertol
was at all times aware of the difficulty Atlas was experiencing, and this
constituted notification under Section 1-201(27). Official Comment 4 to
Section 2 -607 provides that notification of breach "need merely be sufficient
to let the seller know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be
watched."
COMMENT
Under Section 2-316 of the 1954 Code, a general disclaimer was of
no value since the exclusion of the implied warranties of merchantability
and fitness for a particular purpose both required specific language. Under
the 1958 version, a general disclaimer is still ineffective to exclude the im-
plied warranty of merchantability but it is effective to exclude the im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose if it is in writing and
conspicuous.
G.M.D.
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SECTION 2-318. Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties
Express or Implied
YENTZER V. TAYLOR WINE Co.
409 Pa. 338, 199 A.2d 463 (1964)
Plaintiff, a hotel manager, personally purchased on his employer's
behalf certain bottles of liquor which were intended for consumption by
the hotel guests. While preparing the wine for serving, the plaintiff was
struck and injured in the eye by a cap which was suddenly propelled from
one of the bottles. In an action against the manufacturer for breach of
the warranties that the goods were safely packed and fit for the ordinary
purposes for which they were bought, the lower court, citing Hochgertel v.
Canada 'Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d .575 (1963), held that the
plaintiff could not recover and dismissed the complaint.
The supreme court reversed, holding that since the hotel manager
had personally purchased the wine, he was a buyer within the definition
of Section 2-103(1)(a) and as such could recover under Pennsylvania
case law which extends warranties in food cases to persons in the distrib-
utive chain. This was consistent with Section 2-318 which extends war-
ranty protection to guests of a buyer and to members of his family and
household but which takes no position on the question whether warranties
should be extended to the employee of a purchaser. Two judges dissented,
noting that the plaintiff could not be a "purchaser" as that term is defined
in Section 1-201(32, 33) since as a mere agent of the employer, the plain-
tiff acquired no "interest" in the liquor such as to qualify him as a pur-
chaser.
COMMENT
Section 2-318 extends warranty protection to the family, household
and guests of a buyer who is himself protected by warranty, and thus pro-
hibits the application of privity requirements to these persons. However,
this is the extent of the Code's inroad into privity; Comment 3 to Section
2-318 makes it clear that the Code takes no position on the extension
of warranty protection to others in the distributive chain. The court sensibly
refused to consider the employee as a third party beneficiary under Section
2-318; but, having so done, it was faced with the privity requirements of
Pennsylvania case law. In order to allow the plaintiff recovery without
abandoning privity, the court relied on the fact that the plaintiff himself
was a buyer under Section 2-103(1)(a), and hence within the distributive
chain and covered by the warranty. This is simply not true; an agent such
as the plaintiff acquires no interest in the goods such as to place him within
the distributive chain. Obviously the unfortunate rationale reflects the
court's dissatisfaction with its earlier decisions.
G.M.D.
EPSTEIN V. GIANNATTASIO
25 Conn. Super. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-314, supra.
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SECTION 2-326. Sale on Approval and Sale or Return;
Consignment Sales and Rights
of Creditors
GANTMAN V. PAUL
203 Pa. Super. 158, 199 Aid 519 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-401, infra.
SECTION 2-401. Passing of Title; Reservation for Security;
Limited Application of This Section
GANTMAN V. PAUL
203 Pa. Super. 158, 199 A.2d 519 (1964)
The defendant, a furniture dealer, delivered some furniture to the
plaintiff at his home and issued invoices showing the date of the purchase
and several payments made on account. The defendant later removed
the furniture from the plaintiff's house, claiming that the goods had been
delivered on an approval basis and that they had never been finally ap-
proved. In an action for replevin, the lower court entered judgment for the
plaintiff, holding that title to the goods had passed to the plaintiff and
that the defendant's claim that the sale had been on approval was incon-
sistent with the period of time the plaintiff had been allowed to keep the
goods and with the considerable payments made on account.
In affirming, the appellate court noted that under Section 2-401, unless
otherwise expressly agreed, title passes to the buyer at the time the seller
completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods, and held that since the defendant proved neither lack of ownership
in the plaintiff nor superior rights due to a lien or encumbrance, the plain-
tiff was entitled to replevy the goods.
COMMENT
The court permitted the defendant to introduce parol evidence to show
a sale on approval despite the absence of any reference to approval in the
written contract. This was proper under Section 2-326 which distinguishes
a "sale on approval" from a "sale or return." In a sale on approval, the
seller retains title to goods he has placed in the physical possession of a
buyer until the buyer "approves" or accepts them; in a sale or return,
a seller commits himself to take back the goods in the event that the
buyer fails to sell them. Invariably, a sale on approval involves a con-
sumer-buyer, whereas a sale or return involves a merchant-buyer. According
to Section 2-326(4), an "or return" provision must be evidenced by a
written memorandum. This is in recognition of the fact that a contract
with an "or return" feature is at odds with the ordinary contract for the
sale of goods; the "or return" aspect is treated as a separate contract for
Statute of Frauds purposes and as contradicting the sale in so far as
the parol evidence rule is concerned. However, a sale on approval is com-
mon, and parol evidence may be introduced to show that the "on approval"
term is a "consistent additional term" within Section 2-202.
G.M.D.
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SECTION 2-607. Effect of Acceptance; Notice of Breach; Burden
of Establishing Breach After Acceptance;
Notice of Claim or Litigation to Person
Answerable Over
BOEING AIRPLANE CO. V. O'MALLEY
329 F.2d 585 (8th Cir. 1964)
Annotated under Section 2-316, supra.
SECTION 2-708. Seller's Damages for Non-acceptance
or Repudiation
DAGGER BROS., INC. V. TECHNICAL TEXTILE Co.
202 Pa. Super. 639, 198 A.2d 888 (1964)
The defendant agreed to buy from the plaintiff 20,000 pounds of yarn
at $2.15 per pound. The defendant accepted and paid for 3,723 pounds
but on August 12, 1960, repudiated the contract. The plaintiff did not
manufacture the remaining 16,277 pounds but brought an action for the
difference between the contract price and the market price at the time
and place of tender. At trial, however, the plaintiff directed its testimony
to the market price at the time of repudiation and the judgment in its
favor for $4,069.25 reflected this lower price. On appeal, the defendant
contended that the proper measure of damages was the difference between
the cost of manufacture and the contract price and that, since the plaintiff
had failed to prove its cost of manufacture, it was not entitled to anything
more than nominal damages. The court held that under both Section 2-
708(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code and Section 64 of the Uniform
Sales Act, the measure of damages for breach of contract for the sale of
personal chattels is the difference between the selling price and the market
value at the time and place of delivery. The court noted that the defendant
made no contention that the plaintiff had not complied with Section 2-723
in establishing the market price at the time of tender.
COMMENT
The establishment of damages for breach of contract is controlled
by Section 2-708(1) of the Code. This is merely a rewriting of Section
64 of the Uniform Sales Act, allowing the vendor the difference between
the selling price and market value at the time and place of delivery.
However, Section 2-708(1) does not control under certain exceptions
enumerated in Section 2-723. These exceptions occur (1) when the action
is based on anticipatory repudiation and comes to trial before the time for
performance, in which case market price is determined according to the
price at the time of repudiation; and (2) if there is no market price
readily available at those times, in which case the price at any reasonable
time, before or after the delivery date, may be substituted.
Subsection (2) of Section 2-708 also provides an alternative remedy
if the difference between selling price and market price at the time and
place of delivery is inadequate to put the seller in as good a position as
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he would have been in had the contract been performed. Under Subsection
(2) the measure of damages is expected profit (including reasonable over-
head) which the seller would have made from full performance. The only re-
quirement for the use of this alternative remedy is that the remedy in
subsection (1) be inadequate.
B.E.R.
SECTION 2-723. Proof of Market Price: Time and Place
JAGGER BROS., INC. V. TECHNICAL TEXTILE CO.
202 Pa. Super. 639, 198 A.2d 888 (1964)
Annotated under Section 2-708, supra.
SECTION 2-725. Statute of Limitations in Contracts for Sale
GARDINER V. PHILADELPHIA GAS WORKS
413 Pa. 415, 197 A.2d 612 (1964)
Plaintiffs entered into an oral contract with the defendant for the sale
by the latter of gas. Plaintiffs alleged that the defendant expressly and im-
pliedly warranted that the gas would be safely transmitted into their home.
The gas escaped from an underground conduit, causing the plaintiffs personal
injury. The plaintiffs did not bring suit until two years and eight days
after the alleged injury was incurred. The Act of 1895 provides a two-year
statute of limitations for all personal injury actions and Section 2-725 of
the Code provides a four-year statute for actions arising out of any breach
of contract for sale.
The court held that Section 2-725 and the Act of 1895 were clearly
inconsistent. However, since Section 10-103 repeals acts and parts of , acts
inconsistent with the Code, the four-year statute of limitations applied.
Moreover, the intent of the legislature, manifested in part by Sections
1-102 and 2-715 of the Code, indicated that Section 2-725 was to be
determinative.
M.L.A.
ARTICLE 3: COMMERCIAL PAPER
SECTION 3-104. Form of Negotiable Instruments; "Draft";
"Check"; "Certificate of Deposit"; "Note"
UNIVERSAL C.I.T. CREDIT CORP. V. INGEL
Mass. —, 196 N.E.2d 847 (1964)
In return for siding work done on his house, the defendant executed
a promissory note in favor of Allied Aluminum Associates, Inc. which
subsequently negotiated the note to Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp., the
plaintiff. At trial, the defendant admitted his signature on the note and
on an accompanying completion certificate but alleged that the note failed
to meet the requirements for negotiability set out in Section 3-104(1)(b)
90
